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Abstract: This essay examines the emergence of 
HizbuutTahrirIndonesia (HTI) in the public sphere as an 
openly fundamentalist movement in the democratic era. 
HTI existed in Indonesia since the early 1980s. Its early 
presence was as a clandestine organization, because of 
the repressive state, but after 2000 it transformed itself 
into as an open Islamist movement. The fall of Suharto 
and subsequent democratic transition eradicated 
political restrictions, providing oxygen for HTI to 
publicise its religious beliefs and political program. This 
essay focuses on HTI’s view on democracy and nation 
state notion. It demonstrates that conceptually HTI is 
not in line with democracy concept and practically it 
refuses to participate in electoral politics. This writing 
argues that the presence of HTI with its stance anti-
democracy may hamper the process of consolidating 
democracy in Indonesia. 
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Introduction 
After the downfall of Suharto’s regime in 1998, the 
debate of relation between politics and Islam1 revived. The 
																																								 																				
1Compare with the debate over Islamic State, there have been three 
categories, firstly, it is pro-syari’ah group who force to implement syari’ah by 
establishing Islamic state. The second is moderate Muslim who refuses to 
apply the syari’ah and the last is an assortment of secular nationalists. See A. 
E. Hara, Pancasila and The PERDA SYARI’AH Debates in the post-suharto 
Era: Toward a new Political Consensus’, in O.Atsushi, et., al., (ed), Islam in 
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debate created generally three prototypes of thoughts related to 
this cause. The first is a group or a paradigm which declares 
that politics and Islam are two separate and distinct aspects. 
The second is a group that is completely different from the 
former, they said that both islam and politics are united, both 
cannot be separated each other. The last is a party trying to 
exist in middle position by arguing that Islam and politics is not 
fully different and also not wholly compatible.2 
In this paper, I will focus in the second prototypes by 
delivering a case study of HizbuutTahrir Indonesia (abbreviated 
HTI). HTI (the Islamic liberation party) is a trans-national 
fundamentalism Islamic movement which claims that Islam is a 
comprehensive religion covering all aspects in human lives, so 
between Islam and state (politics) should comprehend and 
implement simultaneously. It is therefore not surprised that 
HTI force the revival of caliphate (Islamic state) throughout 
Muslim world. 
This paper begins with a general overview of the 
polarization of discursive relation between state and Islam in 
Indonesian context. It then addresses HTI’s view on democracy 
and nation state and eventually seeks to examine implications of 
in Indonesia and it may weaken the sense of nationalism of 
Indonesia people. 
 
Politics and Islam: an Unfinished Discussion 
Relation between politics and Islam will become an 
ongoing debatable in terms of academic and praxis level. This is 
because Islam cannot be interpreted by only one way or 
method. The fact points that Muslims understand and practice 
the teachings of Islam in daily lives are extremely varied, though 
there is still thread that can bring together between one 
interpretation with others. Multiple interpretations are main 
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, The Wahid institute, 
Indonesia, CSEAS, Japan, CAPAS, Taiwan, 2010. 
2 A. H ‘Rambe, Memahami Hubungan Islam dan politik di Indonesia: 
Suatu Upaya Dialogis Menuju Sikap Gereja yang Konstruktif’ (Understand 
Relation between Islam and Politic in Indonesia: Diaogic Effort toward the 
Constructive Attitude of Church), INTIM-Journal STT Intim,Makassar, No. 
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characteristic of Islam which can be avoided.3 As explained 
before, in general there are three different streams in 
contemporary Islamic political discourses, namely, firstly, a 
group4 which believe that Islam and politics must be separated 
because Islam is only a religious system that does not regulate 
matters relating to politics and government and Islam does not 
has a standardized system of politics. What prophet 
Muhammad implemented in his time could not be claimed as 
the experience of classical government.5 
Moreover, according to this theoretical stream, the term 
“state” (dawlah) is never discovered in the holy Qur’an which 
means political power or authority. These expressions only 
serve as incidental signs and have no relation with political field. 
Indeed, they argue that Qur’an is not a holy book containing 
political science. However, Qur’an encloses a set of ethical 
values and injunctions on social-political behaves, including to 
provide the principles of justices, equality, brother, and 
freedom. As long as the state commits with these principles, it 
can be considered as Islamic values. 
Based on this line of argument, what is important thing 
that should be appeared is that the state must implement and 
ensure the existence of those basis values. Therefore, in their 
viewpoint, the establishment of Islamic state is not essential.  
On the other hand, there is no legitimate reasons to argue 
that Islam is incompatible with the modern political system6 
such democracy and nation-state. Conversely, the second model 
- included this group are HizbuutTahrirIndonesia (HTI), The 
Islamic Defender Front (FPI, Front Pembela Islam), 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI, Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia), other parties committed with fundamentalism 
																																								 																				
3 B. Effendy, Jalan Tengah Politik Islam: kaitan Islam, Demokrasidan 
Negara yang tidakMudah (Middle Road Political Islam: The Link Democracy 
and state which is not Easy), Ushul Press, Jakarta, 2005, p.6. 
4 Include in this group are youth NU and Muhammadiyah who get 
involved in Islamic liberal Network- pioneered by UlilAbsharAbdillah- (Jill), 
LKIS in Jogjakarta, LSAP in Surabaya and other communities who initiated 
the Islamic liberal thoughts in other in Indonesia. See A. H. ‘Rambe, p. 53  
5 B. Effendy, 2005, p.9 
6 B. Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, ISEAS, Siangapore, 
2003, p7. 
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Islamic thoughts, though they have different emphasis in their 
movement- is group who has the political struggle to establish 
the Islamic state as sine qua non and locus primus of the Islamic 
shari’ah implementation.7The shari’ah must be positioned as the 
state constitution and the political sovereignty in hand of 
Divine.8 This model emphasizes the legal and formal aspect of 
Islamic political idealism.9Therefore, the contemporary notion 
of democracy, the modern nation state, and other Western 
concepts are incompatible with Islamic teachings.10 
Actually, this notion is based on the postulate that Islam 
is religion and state as well (inna al-‘Islam din wadawlah). From 
normative point of view, Islam poses the comprehensive 
teaching covering all aspect in human’s lives; therefore Islam 
has economical, social and political system that can be a 
complete and absolute guide in the state. Meanwhile from 
historical perspective, they very often refer to prophet 
Muhammad’s experience in establishing Islamic state in 
Medina.11 The last model is group which take a middle position. 
They try to synthesize these two extreme different views by 
accommodating an element of the first schools of thought and 
other elements of the second flow. For example they believe 
that politics and Islam is a different issue but the two do not 
necessarily have to be combined or separated.12 Islam is not 
only a religious moral but also containing political teachings.  
There are various expressions in Qur’an related to this field. 
																																								 																				
7A. H. Rambe, p., 54  
8B. Effendy, 2003, p. 3  
9B. Effendy, 2005, p. 6  
10This group is also characterized by anti-Western, especially anti-
American and all the cultural products of ideology from the West. For 
example, Hizbut-TahrirIndonesia,which is often held up the themes of 
nuanced criticism of the intervention of  Western countries like the U.S. 
against Islamic countries. Not surprisingly then, the discourse of anti-
capitalism, democracy, nation-state, secularism, globalization, andso often 
echoed by HTI in their movement in terms of in their rallies, seminars, 
conferences, and so forth. 
11 B. Effendy,2003, p.6. 
12 Apparently, there is hesitation that whether Islamic  state built by 
Muhammad can be imitated in the current context or not. The doubt is 
because the Prophet Muhammad is a man who was guided directly by God. 
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However, the groups are not apt to revive Islamic state. The 
essential thing that has to be done is toestablish Islamic society 
(masyarakat madani) in which Muslim’s interest can be actualized 
through the rise participation of political Islam, Islamic parties, 
and Islamic policies made by government.13 
 
A Brief History of HT 
To comprehend the history ofHizbuutTahrir clearly, it 
cannot be separatedfrom the history of its founder, Taqiuddin 
an-Nabhani (1909-1977)14. He established the ideology of 
aparty that became the foundation of allHizbuutTahrir 
branches.15 In other words, one of the prominent features of 
HizbuutTahrir was the acceptance by all branches of 
HizbuutTahrir of a central ideology proposed by an-Nabhani all 
branches of HizbuutTahrir, local interest facing individual 
branches notwithstanding. Therefore, there was substantive 
similarity between all branches of HizbuutTahrir in terms of 
ideological construction, objectives, and themes voiced by 
HizbuutTahrir.16 
																																								 																				
13 It is widely accepted that Indonesia under Suharto’s regime was 
representation of this model. Although Indonesia is not secular or theocrasy 
country, not only guarantee freedom for its people to choice their own 
religion but also Indonesian government provide facilities such as mosque, 
church, temple, and so forth, even it established a religious department 
which set up the religious issues like the implementation of hajj or permit 
the establishment of places of worship, etc. see B. Effendy, 2005,pp. 9-10. 
14Abdul QadeemZullam was the second leader, replacing Taqiuddin 
an-Nabhani who passed away in 1977. When Abdel QadeemZullam died in 
April 2003, another Palestenian, Ata Abul-l-Rushta, substituted him. See 
Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, ‘Hizbut-Tahrir al-Islami: 
Evaluating the Thread Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains 
Nonviolent’, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Routledge, 2006, pp. 315-334 
p., 316-7.     
15AriefIhsanRathomy, PKS and HTI: GenealogidanPemikiranDemokrasi 
(PKS and HTI: Genealogy and Thinking of Democracy), (Jogjakarta, 
FISIPOL UGM, 2005), p., 78.   
16Greg Fealy, ‘HizbuutTahrir in Indonesia: Seeking A “Total” Islamic 
identity’, in Akbarzadeh&Mansouri, Islam and Political Violence: Muslim 
Diaspora and Radicalism in the West, London, Tauris Academic Studies, 2007, 
p.158.    
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HizbuutTahrir was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by 
Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. He was born (1909) in Ijizm, a village near 
Haifa,17 in the Northern Palestine. He passed away in 1977 and 
was buried inAuza’i, Beirut.18 After finishing his study at al-
Azhar University, Cairo, al-Nabhaniwent back to Palestine and 
worked in the Ministry of Education as a teacher at junior high 
school in Kaifa.19 During his study, he became involved in the 
Muslim Brotherhood. He also read literatures authored by its 
thinkers and activists.20 Not surprisingly, when he returned 
home to Haifa, he acted as a key figure in the Palestinian branch 
of the Muslim Brotherhood until the establishment of Israel in 
1949.21 His contact with the organization in turn affected the 
way he thought and looked at the social-political problems 
facing the Islamic world. 
In 1938 Taqiuddin an-Nabhani quit his teaching career 
and started workingas a judge in Sharia courts such as in the 
Islamic court in Ramleh, after studying law at al-
AzharUniverity22. He expressed dismay that the Western values 
had infiltrated the education institution and distorted its 
curriculum. By engaging in the Shariacourt, he wanted to keep 
his distance from the Education Ministry in order to have 
greater opportunities to implement his knowledge ofShariah 
law.23 He was concerned with the implementation of Shariahlaw 
that was not applied totally in the daily lives of citizens. Though 
Islamic family law (ahwal al-shakhsiyah) and its some derivations 
																																								 																				
17David Commins, ‘ Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and The Islamic 
Liberation Party’, in The Muslim World journal, vol. LXXXI,No. 3-4, 1991, p, 
194.  
18Syamsul Arifin, Ideology dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Kaum 
Fundamentalis: Pengalaman HizbuutTahrir Indonesia’, (ideology and Praxis of Social 
Movement of Fundamental Group: The Experience of Hizbuuttahrir Indonesia), 
(Malang: UNM Press, 2005), p. 89.   
19Frank Schneider, ‘Threat Behind a Legal Façade?’, Unpublished 
M.A, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006, p., 13   
20Greg Fealy, p. 153. 
21David Commins, p. 194. 
22Frank Schneider, p., 13  
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had been applied, other aspects were secular or kafir (out of 
Islam).24 
Nabhani’s was anxious and criticised the conditions 
experienced by Muslims, offering solutions, not only when he 
became a teacher and judge, but also when he took advantage 
of the pulpit and preached at the mosque al-Aqsa and al-Ibrahim 
al-Khali.l25 It was his contention that the main problems faced 
by Muslims were political, so that building a strong political 
institution was the solution for this problem. As a result, in 
1953 the Islamic Liberation Party (HizbuutTahrir) was 
established with the prominent aim of revitalising the Muslim 
Word from its current adversity, to liberating Muslims from the 
secular thoughts, system, and laws, and also to restoring the 
Islamic caliphate.26 
 
The Ideology of HT 
 One of the important elements to be reckoned with in 
the study of social movement is the existence of an ideology. In 
this context, ideology means aset of values, ideas, beliefs, 
purposes and rational justifications for individual and collective 
action in a social movement.27Asasocial movement, 
HizbuutTahriracknowledged Islam as itsideology of struggle.  
Like Muslim Brothers, HizbuutTahrir declares that Islamic 
values cover all aspects of daily life without any exception.28An-
Nabhani believed that the al-Qur’an and the hadiths provided 
adequate foundations for legal decisions covering all aspect of 
life. The remaining role of authoritative scholars is to interpret 
																																								 																				
24SyamsulArifin, pp. 91-92. 
25SyamsulArifin, pp. 93-94.  
26Mohammed Nawab Mohammad Osman, ‘Reviving the caliphate in 
the Nusantara: HizbuutTahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy and Its 
Impact in Indonesia’, Working Paper, S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies, Singapore, 2009, pp. 1-2.  
27David A. Snow and S. C. Byrd, Ideology, framing Processes, and Islamic 
terrorist Movement, a paper presented at a New York University Conference, 
2000, p. 120. Available at: 
https://webfiles.uci.edu/sbyrd/home/terroristmovements.snow.byrd.2007.
pdf. Accessed on 20 May 2012.     
28Greg Fealy, p. 153. 
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the basic norms.29 One of Indonesian hizbiyyins30 (Hafidz 
Abdurrahman) argued that Islam is like other religions in that it 
has a set of rules in terms of ritual activities. Due to the breadth 
of Islamic thoughts, Abdurrahman opposed anybody who tried 
to unify Islam with other secular ideologies such as capitalism 
or socialism.31 Compared to others ideologies such as capitalism 
that separates the role of religion from daily life and guarantees 
the absolute freedom of religion, property, person and opinion 
or socialism and communism which declare that religion is ‘the 
opium of the masses’ that prevents a person from taking 
creative and innovative action. Islam is the most comprehensive 
ideology. Both capitalism and socialism contain very real 
weaknesses.32 
Islam is a religion including a spiritual and social field 
simultaneously as an ideology. Thus, it is not surprised that the 
main objective of HizbuutTahrir is to revive Islamic caliphate 
like what previous Muslim implemented in Islamic history such 
as Ottoman Empire.33The obligation of restoration of Islamic 
caliphate for HTI is because of three arguments: (1) normative, 
in this level this compulsion is based on what the Holy Koran 
and Sunnah declared, HTI argues ‘that to establish khilafah is 
compulsory for every Muslim (and) even is considered as the 
noblest religious duty’,34  (2) historical precedence argument 
which refer to what was applied by the prophet Muhammad 
inMedinah era and events after the his death followed by a group 
of caliphs, knownkhulafa al-rasyidun to replace the Prophets and 
HTI also adores other Islamic caliphates, like Umayyad, 
																																								 																				
29ICG, ‘Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizbut-Tahrir’, 
ICG Asia Report No 58, p., 3 
30Hizbiyyinis a name of the followers of HizbuutTahrir 
31SyamsulArifin, , p. 104. 
32David Commins, pp. 197-198.  
33FahlesaMunabari, ‘Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia: The Quest for the 
Caliphate and Shariah, A paper presented at International Workshop on 
Islam and Middle East: Dynamics of Social and Political Transformation, 
Kyoto, University, August 2-3, 2008, p, 9.  
34AgusSalim, ‘The Rise of Hizbut-Tahrir (1982-2004): Its Political 
Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action 
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Abbasid, and Uthmaniyah in Turkey,35 (3) factual condition of 
Muslim’s pain and misery which are largely dealing with Muslim 
such as the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the US invasion in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the suppression against Muslim in 
Southern Thailand, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia, and so 
on.36 
The Islamic caliphate is a form of Islamic government 
headed by a caliph. He is a leader of the ummah (Muslim 
community) and at the same time as representative of God who 
has to enforce the laws of God on earth. The caliphate is 
recognised as just and legitimate system of ruler for Muslims. 
Thoughts embodied in the Qur’an, the sunnah, and what was 
implemented by caliphs in long-history of Islam becomethe 
legal framework of the system.37 
To gain its main goal, the organization proposes a three-
stage process for what HizbuutTahrirhasclaimed as ‘Islamic 
peace revolution’38. The first is the culturing stage (marhalah at 
tatsqif). This stage aims to establish cadres who believe inthe 
truth of thoughts and methods of HizbuutTahrir in order to 
form a group which iscapable of carrying the party’s ideas39. 
The second is the interaction stage 
withummah(marhalahtafa’ulma’a al ummah). It refers to encourage 
ummah to carry the Islamic da’wah obligation so that it works to 
implement Islamic view in life, state, and society. The last stage 
is the accepting power or the takeover of power 
(government)40. This stage intends to implement Islam totally 
																																								 																				
35AgusSalim, p. 214.   
36BurhanuddinMuhtadi,’ The Quest for HizbuutTahririn Indonesia’, in 
Asian Journal of Social Science, 2009, p. 631.   
37Frank Schneider, p., 6 
38BurhanuddinMuhtadi,p., 630  
39Muhammad Muhsin Rodhi, Tsaqofah dan Metode Hizbuut Tahrir dalam 
Mendirikan Negara Khilafah Islamiyah (Civilisation and Method of 
HizbuutTahrir in Establishing the State of Islamic Caliphate), (Bangil: Al-
Izzah, 2008), p., 40 
40MateenSiddiqui, ‘The Doctrine of HizbuutTahriri’, in ZeynoBaran, 
(ed.), ‘The Challenge of HizbuutTahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical 
Islamic Ideology’, Conference report, the Nixon Center, September 2004, p., 
4, available in http://www.islamawareness.net/Deviant/Hizb/confrephiz 
tahrir.pdf, accessed on 3 July 2012.  
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and completely and to spread the Islamic message over the 
world.41 However, HTI claims that the use of violence is an 
inappropriate way in reaching the third step. HTI also asserts 
that Islamic caliphate can only be gained when majority of 
Muslims have Islamic attitude and are actively looking for an 
Islamic state.42 

















Figure 2: Organizational chart ofHizbuutTahrir’s vision for the 
Caliphate43 
 
Furthermore, HizbuutTahrir declares that there are two 
kinds of government, the Islamic and thekufr (unbeliever) 
system44. The kufr system or darulkufur refers to a form of 
government which must be attacked and taken over its power, 
including also although the government is run by a Muslim 
																																								 																				
41 MAJ Daniel J. Ruder, ‘the long War in Central Asia: 
HizbuutTahrir’s Caliphate’, a Monograph, 2006, p 22. Available at: 
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA450614. Accessed on: 24 May 
2012. 
42Greg Fealy, p. 159.  
43SyamsulArifin, , p. 208  
44The Methodology of Hizbut-Tahrir for Change, (London, Al-
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majority, the laws and rulers that are applied within are not 
from Islam such as Indonesia45. If thekufr system is still 
maintained to implement it, according HizbuutTahrir its leader 
should be faced and attacked by military power until failing 
down46. 
 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) 
 HTI is a branch of HizbutUtTahrir that was brought 
from Australia in the early 1980s. In Australia,47 Abdullah bin 
Nuh, anIslamic teacher and preacher who ownedal-Qazahali-
pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Bogor, West Java48, was 
acquainted with hizbiyyinin Sydney. One of the hizbiyyin that 
Abdullah met was Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, aPalestinian 
activist ofHizbuuttahrir who emigrated to Australia in the 1960s. 
Bin Nuh invited al-Baghdadi to disseminate the teachings of 
HizbuutTahrir.49 
When al-Baghdadi arrived in Indonesia in 1982, he 
utilized Bin Nuh’spesantren as HTIheadquarter to disseminate 
Hizbuuttahrir’s teachings. From the headquarter, the teachings 
ofHizbuuttahrir and the recruitment wereexpanded. 
Halaqah(study circles) and daurah (training programmers) were 
introduced as intensive methods of recruitment.50Both al-
Baghdadi and Bin Nuh tried to attract recruits on several 
university campuses such as particularly the Bogor Agricultural 
Institute (IPB), the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), and 
the University of Indonesia(UI). HTI also advanced its recruits 
to many Mosques across Java Island.51 
																																								 																				
45Zaki Mubarak, Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: 
pemikirandanProspekDemokrasi, pp, 254-255.  
46Jean Francois Mayer, ‘Hizbut-Tahrir: The Next Al-Qaida, Really?’, 
in PSIO Occassional Paper, April 2004, p., 17. 
47Abdullah came to Sydney, Australia, where his son was being 
educated.  
48MasdarHelmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and 
Pragmatism, (Singapore, ISEAS, 2010), p., 118 
49Alexander Horstmann, ‘Transnational ideologies and Actors at the 
level of Society in South and Southeast Asia’, in NBR Project report, 2009, p. 
47. 
50BurhanuddinMuhtadi, p. 626.  
51Greg Fealy,p. 155. 
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 Under Soeharto’s regime, HTI became clandestine 
organization to avoidSeoharto’s intimidation. HTI never used 
HizbuutTahrir terminology in their documents. Itwaited until 
Seoharto’s fallto use it.52 In 1998 the downfall of Seoharto’s 
regime took place. This situation encouraged HTI to bring it 
into public view53. Therefore, in early 2000, for the first time the 
organization held an international conference hosted in Jakarta 
which aimed at to introduce the goal of the Islamic caliphate. In 
2001, HTI added “Indonesia” to the party’s formalname.54 12 
August 2007, HTI organized the secondcaliphate conference at 
Bung Karno stadium in Jakarta thatattracted approximately 
100.000 Muslim who were mostly members and sympathizers 
of HTI. This event was widely reported by both the national 
media such as KompasCyber Media and the international media 
such as Reuters and BBC News.55 Until nowHTI has built a 
number ofbranches that are mainly located on Indonesia urban 
areas.56 
 
Resource Mobilization Strategies 
Resource Mobilization theory is a response to limitation 
existing in the early socio psychological approach which view a 
social movement consisting of irrational or angry Individuals 
who join to respond social strain. Resource Mobilization theory 
approach the social movements as rational and organized 
manifestations of collective action. Movements are not 
portrayed as irrational outbursts intended to reduce Individual’s 
distress, but rather as organised contention structured through 
mechanisms of mobilization providing strategic resources to 
sustain collective action.57 
																																								 																				
52Ken Ward, ‘Non-Violent Extremists?HizbuutTahrir Indonesia’, in 
Australian Journal of International Affair, 63:2, 2009, pp. 150-151.  
53MasdarHelmy, p., 120 
54Ken Ward, p. 15i 
55FahlesaMunabari, ‘HizbuutTahrir Indonesia: The Rhetorical 
Struggle for Survival’, in Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad 
Suaedy (ed), Islam Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, (Jakarta: 
Wahid Institute- CSEAS-CAPAS, 2010), 174. 
56Alexander Horstmann, p. 47.  
57See Q., Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
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As an organized and structured social movement, HTI 
under reformasi era is fully aware that to establish Islamic 
caliphate needs the collective action and support of many 
people, at least those who agree with HTI’s ideology, though 
they are not necessarily to become cadre of HTI.58 Ismail 
Yusanto, one of leader and spokesman of HTI said that ‘it is 
not important for us to recruit every single person. Only a few 
chosen people would be enough to effect change. However, the 
masses must be educated about the Caliphate so that when the 
time comes, the will support it’.59 For this purpose, HTI utilizes 
a variety of ways to change mindset of society so as to accept 
HTI’s message. According to Ismail Yusanto, there are three 
basic elements binding society, namely, feelings, thoughts, and 
rules. He declared that to gain the acceptance of society toward 
Islamic sharia and caliphate ideology Islamic value should 
permeate within these components, therefore, society will think, 
feel in line with Islamic Sharia, and live under Islamic rules. All 
aspects of life have to be governed by the Islamic values.60 
It can be clearly seen that HTI uses media publication 
including producing a weekly pamphlet (Al-Islam Bulletin), 
publishing a monthly journal (Al-Wai’e)61, and also translating 
many books into Bahasa Indonesia.62 Using online resources and 
digital sources areother ways that HTI use to promote this 
organization to society. HTI also made its own website 
(http://www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id).63 Besides, HTI is creatively 
establishing informal virtual group such as Face Book 
community, You Tube, theummaOnline Forum and 
Melayu.com, and so forth. In terms of intellectual activities, 
HTI is very vigorously to conduct seminar, talks and 
conferences. In seminar and talks, HTI very often invite the 
																																								 																				
58Mohammed Nawab Mohammad Osman, p. 10.  
59Mohammed Nawab Mohammad Osman,p., 10.  
60You Tube, HizbuutTahrir Indonesia part 3, uploaded by tedungselar 
on 14th November 2006, available at http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=OLYTtz94M_Q&feature=related, accessed in 26th May 2011.  
61GreagFealy, p., 158  
62SyamsulRijal, ‘Making Hizbiyyin: HizbuutTahrir in South Sulawesi’, 
M.A. Unpublished Thesis, The Australian National University, 2009, p., 33 
63SyamsulRijal,   
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important figures (such as Abu BakarBa’asyir, Sidney Jones, 
etc.) in Indonesian society from outside the group as speaker, 
even inviting political or religious figures who disagree with 
their ideology to debate them in the certain issues like khilafah, 
etc.64 HTI is very energetically in using demonstrations and 
rallies to galvanize support from public and build public 
awareness of the truth of its ideology. Issues delivering in such 
demonstration related to not only local problems such as 
corruption, unemployment, poverty, etc., but also international 
issues are very often becoming their concern.65 Since HTI is a 
branch of HizbututTahrir and has international network with 
their counterparts elsewhere over the world. Also, HTI usually 
utilizes mosques astrategy to disseminate itsthoughts. Unlike 
NU and Muhammadiyah organizations that build and preserve 
mosques, HTI only focuses on to be members of mosque 
committee and tosubsequently dominate mosque activities.66 
Another interesting strategy in mobilizing recourses 
doneby HTI is necessity to outside assistance67 (nusrah). Seeking 
nusrah was inspired from Prophet Muhammad’ means of 
spreading Islam. The messenger strived for seeking nusrah and 
he did it many times, as described from the following quotation: 
If we look to the Seerah will see that the Messenger (saw) 
sought the Nusrah from the leaders who possessed 
power. He did this despite the ugly response from tribe 
after tribe. He insisted on seeking the Nusrah and he 
repeated this many times and did not cease in seeking it. 
In his book "At-Tabaqaat al- Kubraa" Imam Muhammad 
IbnSa'd (168-230) mentioned no less than fifteen tribes 
(that the Messenger visited). This persistence if it 
indicates anything, it indicates in a clear manner that 




65SyamsulRijal, p., 31  
66AgusSalim, p., 170 
67Greg Fealy, p. 159.  
68 ‘The Search for the Nusrah’, Khilafah Magazine, Issue 1 vol. 3, 
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The use of informal network (nusrah) is very important 
because HTI leaders can connect with important figures by 
inviting them in HTI events, then, by getting involved these 
informal structures would allow HTI leaders to influence 
certain Muslim groups, and because these informal structures 
encourage HTI leader to disseminate their agenda without 
worrying to face repression.69 This assistance can be seenfrom 
strategic group within community, elite politics, and other 
Islamic activist group, which could join in restoring caliphate. 
Not surprisingly, HTI often holds the events that invite 
politicians. Usually after these sorts ofcontacts, HTI leaders will 
organize regular meetings with those politicians to propagate 
itsideology to them. Alongside politician’s network, HTI builds 
relationship with other Islamists. For example HTI persuade 
the former spiritual head of the Jemaah Islamiyah (Abu 
BakarBa’asyir) and the leader of Islamic Defenders Front (Front 
Pembela Islam), HabibRizieq to become the revival of caliphate 
as key platform of their movement.70 
By utilizing these structured and organized strategies to 
spread HTI’s ideology, it is no doubt that HTI will have a 
significant influence in the social-religious life and politic, 
particularly the rise acceptance of public towards HTI’s main 
aim in their movement. HTI capability to galvanize or mobilize 
mass (through former chairman, Muhammad al-Khathath, 
organised the one million Muslim march in calling for anti-
pornography laws for example) to enforce Indonesian 
government in making policy such the enactment of anti-
pornography and the banning of Ahmadiyah pose an indicator 
that HTI has influence in society.71 
 
Critique toward democracy 
It can be concluded that there are five reasons of why 
HizbuutTahrir and HTI argued that democracy is not in 
accordance with Islamic values. Firstly, democracy is a rulling 
system made by human to escape them from injustice ruler and 
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70Mohammed Nawab Mohammad Osman, p. 32. 
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from ruler’s domination of people on behalf of religion. 
Therefore democracy is absolutely human made, there has no 
correlation with divine revelation or religion.72 That is way 
democracy is never recognized in Islamic history and teachings. 
It is an alien terminology in Islam. Secondly, the notion of 
democracy is emanated from secularism ideology that separates 
religion from life and state.73 
Thirdly, “democracy is a western word and Western term 
applied to rulling of the people, for the people, by legislation of 
the people.”74 It means that democracy give people sovereignty 
to make rules. People also can be entitled to revoke these rules 
according their interest. Due to people as master, they have a 
right to elect and determine the leader or ruler.75 However, in 
Islam sovereignty (as-siyadah) is in hand of shari’ah and power 
(as-sulthan), is in hand of umma.76Umma have no a right make 
laws except god. This is because all activities of human are tied 
by God’s commands and prohibitions, only God who has a 
right to create the laws.77 
Fourthly, democracy is not allowed in Islam because a 
majority vote become the benchmark in the decision-making, 
whereas in Islam according HizbuutTahrir, not all matters can 
be resolved by simply relying on a majority, but must refer to 
legal experts.78There are three patterns of decision making in 
Islam according HizbuutTahrir,firstly, if the matters are related 
to law, the decision-making should be based on the Koran and 
																																								 																				
72 A. Q. Zalloom, Democracy is a System of Kufr: it is Forbidden to 
Adopt, Implement or call for it, Al-khilafah Publication, London, 1995, p.5. 
73 Z. Mubarak, p.275. 
74 A. Q. Zallom, p.7. 
20 A. I Rathomy,PKSdan HTI; GenealogidanPemikirandemokrasi, 
Fisipol UGM, Jogjakarta, 2006, p.134 
75 A. Q Zallom, p. 6.  
76 The term umma means mother. It refers to Islamic conception of 
political community or the importance of Islamic solidarity among Muslims. 
77 Z. Mubarak, p.276 
78 A. I. Ahmad and R. Haryadi, pengusungSyariah di jalurtengah( 
Bearers of Shari’ah in the Middle Path), in A.S Karni (ed), 
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hadith. The second is related to the expertise of people who 
make decision. For instance, a sick person who should be 
treated by a doctor does not need to request approval of a 
majority of votes in determining the settlement decision of his 
illness. In this situation, a doctor who has qualified can handle 
the problem. The last is concerning to technical implementation 
of Shari’ah. In this situation, the majority vote is really needed.79 
Lastly, there has different interpretation of freedom in 
democracy and Islam. Democracy advocates the general 
freedom. For democracy, these freedoms have to be provided 
for citizen, so that they can apply their sovereignty and direct it 
by themselves. They also enable them to choose the rules and 
the members of parliament without worrying about any 
pressure and compulsion80whereas Islam according to 
HizbuutTahrir does not acknowledge these freedoms. For 
example, Islam does not condone freedom of belief. Muslim 
cannot change their religion. Because this is not in line with 
Shari’ah, anyone who wants to change his religion will be 
sentenced. 
Beside these five factors above, HTI’s rejection to 
democracy can be also seen in its behaviors of political 
participation. For example, HTI reject to get involved in 
election because it is part of democracy while the latter is not an 
Islamic system. It is worth to pay attention what one of HTI’s 
members, Abd. Samad, said about not participating in the 
general election, as follow: 
‘The reason I did not vote based onsyari'a notion. Just like 
that! Seeing from the law perspective, the election is 
mubah (permissible). But when talking about the election 
purposes, what its purpose? The goal is to choose 
representatives. What their Duty? Their task in the 
Islamic view is only to deliver aspirations related to 
Islam’s interests. Not to make laws. Regarding with the 
making of laws, in the view of Islam, the right to make 
laws is only Allah Swt. It means the current government 
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institution have not become Islamic government due to 
serving as the function of making laws.”81 
 
Similarly, in an article entitled “HTI 
PilkadaTakSesuaiSyariat Islam” (HTI Election is not compatible 
with Syari’ah), another member of HTI, FitraSagara, argued that 
the general election is a part of democracy while democracy is a 
secular culture and thus the general election is also a secular 
culture that is not compatible with Islamic syari’ah.82 
However, HTI’s refusal to take participation in general 
election does not bind its members since according to Ismail 
Yusanto that ‘casting votes on voting days are the right of every 
Muslim’. But he emphasizes that political parties whose agenda 
to apply the caliphate and shari’ah are deserve to cast a vote.83 In 
Islamic perspective, according to him, general election can be 
equated with the Islamic concept of wakalah (representation), 
where its original law is permissible (mubah) as long as fulfilling 
Islamic requirements, namely wakil (representative), muwakkil 
(people who are represented by wakil), ‘amal (activities that will 
be conducted by the wakil on behalf of muwakkil’s command), 
and ‘aqad (contract made by both sides).84If these activities 
performed by wakil are in line with syari’ah, they are accepted, 
but if not they are rejected. One example of the un-islamised 
acts done by wakil is the creation and the stipulating of any 
legislation that comes in addition to syari’ah since as mentioned 
earlier, the only law maker is God.85 
																																								 																				
81SyamsulArifin, p. 160 
82 ‘HTI: PilkadaTakSesuaiSyariat Islam’ (HTI: Election not 
Compatible with Islamic Syari’ah), KOMPAS. COM, 21 February 2008, 
available in http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/02/21/1240529/ 
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Caliphate and Shariah, p.26.  
84Muh. Ismail Yusanto, ‘PernyataanHizbuutTahrir Indonesia 
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Therefore, it is not surprising,from 2005 until the present 
this notion (not participation in the general election) was 
modified as recognized by leader of HTI, Hafidz Abdurrahman. 
He argued that the election still can become a means of struggle 
like in some countries in which there are some activists of 
HizbututTahrir who are acting as member of parliament. 
Moreover he does not see whether the election is a form of 
democracy or not. The election is only artificial method to elect 
the representatives and the head of state. This had applied in 
the long history of Islam in election of the head of state.86 Even 
Ismail Yusanto in an international caliphate conference on 
August 12, 2007 in Jakarta, declared that HTI would enliven the 
political scene of Indonesia. This organization was preparing 
itself into a political party. ‘It's already in our plans’, said 
Ismail.87Until now, however, HTI has not turned into a political 
party that is recognized by the state 
However, for Munabari, what Ismail said that HTI gives 
freedom to its members to use vote right, its stance not to 
participate in general election, and its will to form a political 
party are such kind of’ more political maneuvering than the 
truth’.88 It is done on purpose to avoid charge from the 
government that HTI violates the law on general election 
number 12 years 2003,(‘any actions or activities that discourage 
people to exercise their rights to cast votes on voting days be 
considered illegal and thus is subject to punishment’),89and to 
implicitly reveal its disenchantment of the failure of Islamic and 
secular parties in fulfilling people aspirations. He added that the 
political maneuvering is one of HTI’s strategies to maintain its 
footing so that it feels safe to disseminate its agendas.90In other 
words, in my opinion, though there has been change HTI’s 
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behavior by getting involved in the election, HTI’s involvement 
does not based the awareness or beneficial democracy as system 
of government, even it only manipulate the election to 
disseminate its objectives and ideology. In other words, HTI 
does not intend to support the process of democracy even is 
going to destabilize the consolidated democracy. 
 
Critique toward Nation State 
 An-Nabhani declares that the broad presence of 
patriotism and nationalism is one of major obstacles to party in 
establishing Islamic caliphate.91One of impacts of the Ottoman 
Empire’s downfall is that Muslim became divided, based on 
geography and nationality, so that they became weak to face 
colonials. The fact shows that Muslim fight each other because 
of their own national interest. Every Islamic country is more 
concern about his national attention. 
It has been argued by Yusanto quoted by Muhtadi92that 
national expressions are understood as tribal fanaticism clearly 
does not suit with the ideals of Islam. Moreover, nationalism is 
a form of the pre-Islamic tribal fanaticism revived in modern 
style and rhetoric. HTI, therefore, views solidarity, 
brotherhood, and sense of Muslim nationhood should be 
underpinned by Islamic brotherhood, not based on race, blood, 
clan, tribe, birth place, language, geographic boundaries, genetic 
ties, and all elements of nationalism. 
It is widely accepted by activists of HTI that there is 
deliberated effort (conspiracy) of West to become umma into 
small nation-state. This effort can be traced back to when 
Ernest Renan, postulated the concept of nationalism that 
caused the emergence of nation-state since the Ottoman 
Empire threatened Western countries. After the fall of this 
Empire in the early twentieth century, the nation-state idea was 
expanded in Muslim societies. As a result, Muslim societies 
divide into the small nation state and the umma was no longer a 
foundation basis for political community.93 
																																								 																				
91 B. Muhtadi, p. 632 
92 B. Muhtadi, pp 632-633 





JICSA    Volume 01- Number 01, June 2012 98 
 
The Challenge of Democracy and Nation State 
HTI becoming as an inimical to consolidating democracy 
can be seen at level of support for democratic regime principles 
and for modern nation state as preferred political community. 
Several reason of why HTI become a hindrance to democracy 
will be considered. Firstly, HTI’s strong rejection of democracy, 
mainly its assumption that the Islamic caliphate which applies 
Shari’a within is the only best breakthrough to the complex 
catastrophes happened in Indonesia and Muslim World in 
general, can disturb the process of democratic consolidation, 
creating the instability of democracy. This is because, according 
to some scholars such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, that a 
consolidated democracy may be implemented if three factors 
are meet, namely: 
Behaviorally, no significant institutions or actors spend 
significant resources attempting to achieve their 
objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or turning 
to violence. Attitudinally, a strong majority of citizens 
believe that the democratic procedures and institutions 
are “the only game in town” to govern collective life in 
society. Constitutionally, governmental and non-
governmental forces alike become committed to 
resolving conflicts within the specific laws, procedures 
and institutions sanctioned by the democratic process.94 
 
In a same vein, Prezeworski argues that: 
 
Democracy is consolidated when under given political 
and economic conditions a particular system of 
institution becomes the only game in town, when no one 
can imagine action outside the democratic institutions, 
																																								 																				
94Cited from Bob S. Hadiwinata and ChirstophSchuck, ‘Mapping 
Indonesia’s Way towards Democracy: In Search of a Theoretical Frame, in 
Hadiwinata and ChristophSchuck (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia…,p., 14.    
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when all the loser wants to do is to try again within the 
same institutions under which they have just lost.95 
From these quotations, certainly democracy can be 
consolidated when there is a shared conviction among political 
elites, political organizations, mass-based organizations, and 
more importantly the public at large that democracy is a useful 
and worth breakthrough in dealing with a wide range of 
deteriorations coming about in Indonesia. Democracy is the 
only rule of game acknowledged in the state and all segments of 
society should take part in achieving democracy. But it does not 
overlook the diversity of opinions, organizations, and political 
parties. As long as the difference is under democratic norms, 
procedures, and expectations, it is able to be acceptable. In 
other words, there is no a group for example, which takes the 
advantage of democracy transition such as enjoying the 
freedom of expression and assembly to disrupt or even replace 
democracy with another system. For instance, HTI exploits 
democracy such as its presence in the democratic public sphere, 
to destroy democracy since HTI has main goal to establish an 
Islamic state. In this context, the emergence of HTI in the 
public realm is acceptable but the problem lies in HTI’s 
objectives that are not in accordance with democracy’s aims. 
Secondly, the strong refusal of HTI to engage in the 
election or the manipulation of democracy as opposed the goal 
of democracy can disrupt the democratic consolidation. The 
reason for this is that Mujani96 argued that one element of 
democracy is democratic culture that consists of political 
engagement and trust in political institutions. This dimension 
can encourage citizen to get involved in democratic politics and 
integrate them into the democratic system. These are important 
things because of helping to make democracy work properly 
and to become stable and more consolidated. 
Thirdly, HTI’s will to establish umma, Muslim 
brotherhood which is tied by religious identity, entirely Muslim 
world on the earth will potentially destabilise the nation state 
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building because this can bring people from the political loyalty 
of nation state to umma. As a result, HTI is very often to 
accentuate the global jihad priority of fighting against ‘far 
enemy’ rather the relatively ‘near enemy’. HTI always raises in 
its demonstration for example the far issue such as the Israel 
occupation of Palestine and the US invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan rather than wrestling near or local concerns that 
correlate with national interest. Indeed the political loyalty to 
nation state is a precondition to realize the stability of the state 
that is an important element for democratic 
consolidation.97Fourthly, it has been argued that 
HizbuutTahrir’s concept of Islamic Caliphate that does not 
recognize fixed boundaries or territories is completely 
contradictive with the concept of nation state which 
acknowledges the idea of a fixed territory. Thus, the nation 
state is a basis element of democracy. There will be no 
democracy without the nation state. On the other words,the 
two concepts of democracy and nation-state are impossible to 
be separated.98 
Fifthly, the presence of Islamic fundamentalism 
movements itself which promote vigorously the 
implementation of Islamic syari’ah such as MMI (Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia or Council of Indonesian Jihadists), HTI, 
and so forth seem to undermine the inclusivism and pluralism 
which have became the foundation of the original idea of 
Indonesia as state and nation and even created sectarianism. 
HTI also wants to replace the Pancasila with Islamic caliphate. 
It was proven by holding the International conference of 
caliphate in a Jakarta stadium rally in 2007 which was attended 
more than 80.000 people. This conference called for the 
establishment of Islamic caliphate and dismantling of the 
Pancasila-based Indonesia Republic.99Mujani, quoted from A. 
E. Hara- onr anti-syariah proponent, argued that the effort of 
HTI to implement syari’ah laws does not appreciate democracy 
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and pluralism because it does not treat the citizen, especial 
women and non-Muslim, equally. Another anti-syari’ah 
proponent, LuthfyAssaukanie from Liberal Islam Network 
(Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL) argued that HTI completely does 
not coincide with the Republic of Indonesia because of its 
promoting a different kind of political system.100 The Republic 
of Indonesia is final and Pancasila as the ideology of Indonesia 
state is a historical agreement that compromises the different 
religious and views existing in Indonesia society for a long time 
ago. Therefore, Pancasila is really needed for democracy in 
Indonesia and to prevent some groups who want to change 
Indonesia into an Islamic caliphate.101 
 
Conclusion 
From explanation above, it can be concluded that HTI is 
a trans-national group who disagree with the concept of 
democracy and nation state because they are from outside 
Islamic values or ideology. Even both concepts are more likely 
to disrupt the Muslim world. The large amount of drawbacks 
occurred in the Muslim world are because of implementing 
these kufr (unbeliever) system. 
The refuse of HTI to democracy and nation state can be 
a hindrance of the democratic consolidation in Indonesia and 
will weaken the sense of nationalism of Indonesia people. 
Because there is a party who think and utilize a different system 
of democracy, even want to change the system of democracy 
into Islamic state. This condition discourages the democratic 
atmosphere which is being built by Indonesia after the downfall 
of Suharto regime in 1998. Another reason is that HTI does not 
recognize a fixed territory of nation state. If there has no nation 
state, democracy won’t appear because both democracy and 
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